Testing an Economics Theory of Copyright: Historical Materials and Fair Use by Darr, Frank P
Boston College Law Review
Volume 32
Issue 5 Number 5 Article 2
9-1-1991
Testing an Economics Theory of Copyright:
Historical Materials and Fair Use
Frank P. Darr
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frank P. Darr, Testing an Economics Theory of Copyright: Historical Materials and Fair Use, 32 B.C.L.
Rev. 1027 (1991), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol32/iss5/2
TESTING AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF




In copyright law, the doctrine of fair use permits a copier to
use some portion of a protected writing without securing the per-
mission of the copyright holder.' Without that protection, the copier
is an infringer and subject to potentially significant liability for
violating the rights of the copyright holder. 2 One purpose of fair
use is essentially utilitarian, the creation of new works of indepen-
dent significance. 3 Teachers, for example, rely on the doctrine when
t Copyright © 1991 Frank P. Darr.
• Assistant Professor of Business Law, College of Business, The Ohio State University.
B.A. 1979, The University of Akron; J.D. 1982, The Ohio State University.
See Copyright Act of 1976, § 107, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). For the text of this section,
see infra note 30.
2 The Copyright Act provides that an author or other holder of a copyright may recover
for a copyright infringement by bringing suit. In essence, a claim for infringement consists
of showing that the claimant has a valid copyright and that the infringer has copied the
protected material. F. COOPER, LAW AND THE SOFTWARE MARKETER 65 (1988). Illegal copying
may include the use of original material in a translation, abridgement or condensation of an
original work. Id. at 69. Anyone who copies or distributes copies of a copyrighted work
without the permission of the holder is an infringer. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
Remedies under the Copyright Act are extensive. The infringer may be liable for actual
damages and profits or, alternatively, statutory damages of $500 to $20,000 for each infringe-
ment. Id. § 504. In a willful violation of copyright law, damages can be increased to $100,000
for an infringement. Id. § 904(c). Furthermore, authors who deposit the material with the
Library of Congress and follow the other requirements for registration can recover costs and
attorneys' fees. Id. § 505. Additional remedies include the issuance of an injunction to prevent
infringement and the impoundment and destruction of improper copies, Id. §§
See W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (1985). Patry describes
the development of the basis for fair use:
English judges were quite explicit in articulating their rationale for permitting
the unconsented use of one author's work by a subsequent author. That ration-
ale, found initially in the "fair abridgement" context, was that the second author,
through a good faith productive use of the first author's work, had, in effect,
created a new, original work which would itself promote the progress of science
and thereby benefit the public.
Id.
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preparing course material containing copyrighted text. 4 Likewise,
scholars rely on the privilege when creating biographical and his-
torical works. 5 Historians and critics, for example, have looked to
the unpublished writings of their subjects to add depth to their
work.6 In this regard, the use of unpublished writings appears
particularly consistent with the utilitarian purpose of the fair use
privilege.?
The broad protection afforded unpublished writings by the
courts, however, does not conform to the utilitarian purpose of fair
use. Despite the obvious importance of unpublished letters, diaries
and manuscripts, Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions have
reduced fair use protection for authors copying from such sources. 8
Because these decisions do not fit within an understanding of fair
use based on utilitarian notions, they have provoked extensive de-
bate within the legal community about the application of fair use
to unpublished writings. 9
H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67 (1976). When the issue has been
litigated, however, a court seldom has approved academic copying. See W. PATRY, supra note
3, at 177-90.
5 See, e.g., W. PATRY, supra note 3, at 65-91; Benedict, Historians and the Continuing
Controversy over Fair Use of Unpublished Manuscripts, 91 AM. HIST. REV. 859, 863 (1986).
6 See ZINSSER, EXTRAORDINARY LIVES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY
11-14 (1985) (part of the craft of good biography is the use of personal writings, such as
letters and diaries, to understand better the subject's motivations).
7
 This argument is premised on the constitutional provision that permits Congress to
enact copyright law. The Constitution provides that Congress may enact these statutes "to
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. For a discussion
of the utilitarian rationale of copyright, see Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1105, 1107-10 (1990). For a critique of the narrowness of the utilitarian approach, see
Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (1990),
and Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 Outo Sr. L.J. 517,
539-46 (1990).
g See Harper and Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Salinger v.
Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987); Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 748 F. Supp.
105 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Love v. Kwitny, 706 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); New Era Publica-
tions Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd on other grounds,
873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.), rehearing en bane denied, 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1168 (1990).
g The opinions in these cases suggest some of the philosophical problems with which
the courts are dealing. Compare the majority and minority decisions in Harper and Row,
Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1986) and New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry
Holt & Co., 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989). The debate has entered the legal literature as
Second Circuit judges have debated one another about the appropriate standards for fair
use of unpublished materials. See Newman, Copyright Law and the Protection of Privacy, 12
COLUM. J.L. Sc ARTS 459 (1988); Newman, Not the End of History: The Second Circuit Struggles
with Fair Use, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 12 (1989); Miner, Exploiting Stolen Text: Fair Use or Foul
Play, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1 (1989). Judge Leval, the district court judge in Salinger and
New Era, has also entered the fray and drawn a rebuttal. See Leval, supra note 7; Weinreb,
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The conflict that these recent decisions have caused also raises
significant questions about copyright and fair use for academic
consideration.'° To resolve the conflict, many writers suggest courts
should use an economic theory of wealth maximization to set bound-
aries for copyright protection." Because of the uncertainty histor-
ically surrounding fair use,I 2 few have made the claim that the
courts already decide cases in a way that applies the utilitarian
approach. In contrast, Professor Landes and Judge Posner argue
that the methods of law and economics already describe the results
of fair use cases in terms of wealth maximization. is That argument
is doubtful, however, when the theory is applied to the cases ex-
tending copyright protection to unpublished writings.
supra note 7. See generally Abrams, First Amendment and Copyright: the Seventeenth Donald C.
Brace Memorial Lecture, 351 COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1 (1987); Conley, Author, User, Scholar, Thief:
Fair Use and Unpublished Works, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 15 (1990); Note, The Chilling
Effect of Overprotecting Factual Narrative Works, 11 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 75 (1988);
Note, Should Copyright Law Make Unpublished Works Unfair Game?, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1399
(1990); Note, Salinger v. Random House: A Biographer's Dilemma, 34 ST. Louis U.L.J. 149
(1989); Perry, What Publishers Call Quoting, Computer Industry Calls Piracy as Industries Face Off
on Capitol Hill, Wall St. J., April 23, 1991, at A22, col. 1.
10 For a broadly researched review of the area, see Bilder, The Shrinking Back: The Law
of Biography, 43 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1991).
" See, e.g., Gordon, - Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 CoLum. L. REV. 1600 (1982) (fair use permits uncom-
pensated transfers that are socially desirable but not possible within the market); Landes and
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 181 LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989). For a comparison
of the economic justifications for patent and copyright, see R. BENKO, PROTECTING INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 21-24 (1987). Others have used a
law and economics approach to question more generally the need for extensive copyright
protection. Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 291.-323 (1970). The legal literature, however, is
not uniform in its treatment. Harvard's Professor Fisher, for example, finds a law and
economics model incomplete and offers a more complicated value-based system for ap-
praising fair use questions. Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. Ray.
1659 (1988); see also Dratler, Distilling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43 U.
MIAMI L. Ray. 233 (1988) (urging faithfulness to the elements found in section 107 of the
Act).
It Justice Story described the problem with fair use in terms that remain relevant:
"Patents and copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases belonging to forensic
discussion, to what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where distinctions are, or at
least may be, very subtile and refined, and sometimes, almost evanescent." Folsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). This conclusion is borne out in the
interpretation of the four factors listed in the Copyright Act of .1976, 17 U.S.C. 1111 101-914,
for determining whether a use is fair. See infra note 33.
13 Landes and Posner, supra note 11, at 357. The suggestion that utilitarianism and
wealth maximization are the same will likely provoke disagreement from advocates of law
and economics. See, e.g., Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
103 (1979). This article does not attack the general assumptions of either approach, so the
debate is irrelevant to the conclusions suggested here.
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The Landes and Posner model of copyright suggests three
factors critical to deciding whether a particular use is fair. First, fair
use should favor productive uses.' 4 Second, fair use should apply
when the author's incentive to draft an original writing was not
economic. t 5 Third, fair use should permit the use of limited portions
of an unpublished writing.' 6 Though this model would generally
favor limited fair use protection for unpublished writings, the five
federal decisions concerning unpublished writings do not consis-
tently follow the model's predictions. 17
Several reasons may explain the judicial departure from the
Landes and Posner model. First, it may be impossible to use the
model. The informational problems it presents would preclude the
most diligent of judges from trying to apply it.'s This explanation,
however, ignores the courts' ability to adopt second-best rules as
proxies for complete information. 19 Second, the case outcomes may
diverge from the model because the model results in indeterminate
solutions. Either there is no one right answer, or the right answer
keeps changing. 2° If the courts are using a model that is itself
indeterminate, the inconsistent decisions could reflect that prob-
lem.2 ' The problem of indeterminacy, however, should not affect
contemporaneously decided cases. 22 Moreover, the critique of in-
determinacy, like the one of informational limits, is essentially nor-
mative; it suggests why courts should not use the economic model
but does not address the question of whether they do use it despite
its normative flaws. 25
A more likely conclusion is that edges decide cases using a
more complicated set of values than the economic "determinism"
that Landes and Posner suggest. 24 Because the results of the cases
do not conform particularly well with the expected results from the
economic model, one should consider the possibility that judges
decide cases for the reasons they list in their decisions. If that is so,
then any attempt to construct a theory of decision-making in fair
14 See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
"3 See infra text accompanying note 77.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 78-120.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 121-24.
18 Id.




24 See infra text accompanying notes 129-39.
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use cases should consider the literature that attempts to interpret
the reasoning judges use and incorporate it as an explicit part of
the model.
This article explores the problem in four sections. Part I pro-
vides a general description of copyright law and the fair use defense.
Part II describes the Landes and Posner model. Part III predicts
the outcome of cases involving unpublished writings based on sec-
ond-best rules consistent with the Landes and Posner model and
presents the sample of reported cases involving unpublished writ-
ings. This section demonstrates that the economic model fails to
account for the results of these cases. Part IV analyzes the normative
criticisms of the economic model and suggests that they do not
address the positive claim made by the law and economics approach
to copyright. It then offers some reasons for that failure that suggest
judges hold a more complicated normative view of copyright law
than the academic model suggests.
I. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND FAIR USE
Title 17 of the United States Code contains the Copyright Act
of 1976." Section 102 of the Act authorizes copyright protection
for original works of authorship. 26 Coverage extends to any literary
work, which the law defines as the expression of an idea in a
particular form. 27 If the author of an original work can claim a
valid copyright, the author receives a bundle of rights in the par-
ticular form of the expression. These rights permit the author to
control display and reproduction of the material, and the creation
of derivative works (e.g. movies from books). 28 These rights subsist
from the time of the creation of the work for a term of the life of
the author plus fifty years. 29
Authors, however, retain only partial control of original writ-
ings. Importantly, section 107 codifies the fair use doctrine." The
25 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988).
26 Id. § 102.
27 Id. § 101. The law does not protect the underlying idea, only the particular expression
of the idea. Id. § 102(b).
" Id. § 106
29 Id. 302(a). Works for hire have copyright protection for seventy-five years from
publication or one hundred years from creation, whichever is less. Id. § 302(c).
50 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). Section 107 provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 [concerning the rights of the
author], the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction
in copies . . . or other means specified in that section, for purposes of ..
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statute sets out two general requirements for the application of the
fair use defense. First, the use must be for one of the enumerated
purposes such as teaching, scholarship or research. Second, the use
must be fair, based on a balancing of the purpose of the copying,
the nature of the copied work, the amount and quality of the
amount copied and the effect of the copying on the market for the
original work. 31
Despite codification of the fair use doctrine, the statute provides
little guidance for specific cases. As the legislative history of the
section suggests, "no real definition of the concept [of fair use] has
ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of
reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case
raising the question must be decided on its own facts." 32 The cases
bear out the view that many factors affect the doctrine's applica-
tion." As Professor Nimmer concludes, "[w]hat facts will be suffi-
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of
a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include—(1) the purpose and character of the use, induding whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id. The Copyright Act provides exceptions for libraries, cable transmission and music. Id.
§$108,111,115.
Id. § 107.
" H. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976). But see W. PA-rav, supra note 3, at
4-5 (questioning the historical sources of the fair use privilege).
" The first factor section 107 directs the courts to consider is the character of the use.
17 U.S.C. § 107(1). The statute specifically favors some uses, such as nonprofit educational
uses. On the other hand, there is no safe harbor for such a use, according to the legislative
history of the section. See W. PATRY, supra note 3, at 368-69. The cases lead to some curious
distinctions. As one writer on the subject explained, "A use whose 'character' is commercial
may nevertheless have a 'purpose' of a type qualifying for fair use, e.g., criticism or comment.
Under these circumstances a proper 'purpose' may rebut an otherwise unacceptable com-
mercial 'character.'" Id. at 367. Importantly, "while the 'nature' of an entity may be nonprofit
or noncommercial, a particular use it makes of copyrighted material may be 'commercial' in
character." Id. at 370. In short, even seemingly protected academic copying may take on a
commercial character in the eyes of the courts.
The second factor is the nature of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2). In this
regard, the division is usually between creative and informational materials..The more
creative the work, the less likely copyright protection will be mitigated.
The third factor is the amount and substantiality of the portion used. Id. 107(3). The
greater the amount copied, the less likely the copying will be a fair use. Furthermore, courts
judge the qualities of the copied materials. The more the copying appropriates the commer-
cial value of the piece, the less likely fair use applies. See W. PATRY, supra note 3, at 449-52.
Finally, section 107 requires the court to consider the commercial impact of the use. 17
U.S.C. § 107(4). The United States Supreme Court has adopted two standards for reviewing
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cient to raise this defense in any case is not easily answered."'"
Venturing where others might fear, Landes and Posner offer a law
and economics approach to interpret the application of the fair use
privilege.
II. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COPYRIGHT LAW
Like the economic explanation of common law, 35 an economic
theory of copyright purports to be an explanation of what judges
do in interpreting the Copyright Act. 36 In this sense, it is a positive
theory attempting to describe how results are reached rather than
a normative theory suggesting the goals copyright should seek to
achieve. 37 As an application of economic theory, the economic anal-
ysis of copyright attempts to explain "to what extent copyright law
can be explained as a means for promoting efficient allocation of
resources. 9)58
Landes and Posner suggest that an economic theory of copy-
right would recognize both the benefits and costs of a system that
provides a property right in a writing. It then would balance the
costs of enforcement and limiting access to the work against the
benefits of providing incentives to create." They explain the balance
that must be struck for a copyright system to promote the greatest
social welfare. First, the system must provide an incentive for an
author to create. Under an efficient system, an author must have
the opportunity to recover the costs of writing." The costs the writer
must recover include both a fixed cost of creation, i.e., writing and
the impact of copying. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449
(1984). If the copying is for commercial use, there is a presumption of injury to the value of
the copyright. Id. On the other hand, the owner of the copyright must show by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that a noncommercial use is likely to be harmful. Id. In any case,
the evidence of commercial harm will center on a finding that the copy in some way usurp
the existing or potential commercial market for the original work. See W. PATRY, supra note
3, at 455-58. If the plaintiff fails to show that he will suffer an injury from the commercial
use of copyrighted material, the defendant may defeat an infringement claim. In Consumers
Union of the United States v. General Signal Corp.„ for example, a vacuum cleaner manufacturer
that quoted a favorable report in Consumer Reports for its product defeated an infringement
claim on the basis that the use of the material did not affect the plaintiff's future sales. 724
F.2d 1044, 1050-51 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).
" 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 at 13-63 (1990).
" See R. POSHER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 21 (3d ed. 1986).
" Landes and Posner, supra note 11, at 325.
37 R. POSNER, supra note 35, at 21.
'8 Landes and Posner, supra note 11, at 325.
39 Id. at 326.
14 Id. at 327.
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preparing the book for publication," and a variable cost, i.e., the
cost of producing each copy of the book. 42 The author will write
the book if the expected revenue exceeds the cost of producing it."
The rationale for copyright, however, arises from the assumption
that the variable cost of producing a book is the same for the author
and any infringer." Thus, for an author to invest time creating a
new work, he must expect his total revenue less his cost of copies
to exceed the fixed cost of writing the book. To the extent that
revenues for an author are driven down by infringing copies, which
can be sold for their variable cost because the infringer does not
incur the author's fixed costs of writing, the incentive to produce
new work is lost.45 Copyright, by prohibiting unauthorized copying,
solves the problem of marginal cost copies destroying the incentive
to write.
Superficially, the economic explanation to this point would jus-
tify placing complete control of the work in the first author. The
problem with that approach is that it will stifle the next author. As
Landes and Posner suggest, the number of works produced might
very well decrease if the level of protection is too high. All works
contain elements that are copied from some other text.46 If protec-
tion is too extensive, authors will have to engage in expensive
searches, risk liability, or pay royalties to write.47 If these costs are
too high, authors may simply decide that the effort is not remu-
nerative and quit. 48 Thus, for the optimal number of works to be
produced, an economically rational law must provide the means for
new material to be produced as well as provide protection to existing
materials. The law would do so by limiting the scope of the copy-
right to the actual expression and not the ideas, 49 limiting the term
of protection 5° and providing for some copying to be deemed fair
use. 5 '
Landes and Posner then make a startling assertion. Unlike
Congress, the courts and most authorities on copyright who do not
4L Id at 326-27.
42 Id. at 327.
" Id.
" Id. at 328,
4 ' Id. at 329.
46 Id. at 332.
" Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 347-53.
'° Id. at 361-63.
5 ' Id. at 357-61.
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claim any success in finding an organizing principle for fair use,52
Landes and Posner suggest, lolur economic model . explains
the major applications of the fair use principle."53 Their fair use
examples concern the effect of the use on the market for an original
work, the cost of producing a new work and the transaction costs
of securing rights to copy unexceptional parts of a prior writing in
a new work. The clearest example they give is the "high-transaction-
cost case."54 If a writer wants to copy a small portion of a copy-
righted work, the economic theory of copyright would permit the
use because securing the necessary license would be too costly and
the proposed use would not harm the market for the original work.
"The copier here is neither a firm selling copies nor a potential
purchaser of copies, so his projected use affects neither the supply
of copies nor the demand for them." 55 Similarly, the general use of
the ideas and sequencing of a prior work might be permitted if it
is a productive use, rather than one that simply replaces the work
from which the ideas are taken. 56
The explanation of fair use for reviews, including those that
reduce the market for the reviewed work, is more problematic than
the prior general example. Landes and Posner justify use of copy-
righted material in reviews because it is essentially a form of adver-
tising for the work and thus, in general, increases the available
market.57 They recognize, however, that in individual cases the
market for a particular work may be destroyed if the review is bad
enough. 58
Copyright law likewise permits parody because it functions as
a form of criticism,59 but Landes and Posner have a difficult time
identifying the market function of this form of criticism and do not
offer an explanation of what it is. Moreover, they face a sticky
problem with parody's close cousin, burlesque. They argue that
burlesque is an infringement because it operates as a substitute and
thus reduces the revenues of the original.6" It is very difficult to
imagine, however, that Abbott and Costello Meet Frankenstein signifi-
52
 See supra text accompanying notes 12 and 32-34.
" Landes and Posner, supra note 11, at 357.
54 Id.
55 Id.
" Id. at 360.
57 Id. at 358-59.
58 Id. at 359 n.45. The loss is justified because, on balance, the information tends to
increase the demand for copyrighted work, Id.
" Id. at 360.
6" Id. at 359-60.
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cantly affected the market for Mary Shelley's classic novel. Thus,
the line between parody and burlesque is difficult to discern.
III. ANALYSIS
The difficulty in conforming the economic theory of copyright
and the case law may be more important than first suggested by the
examples of criticism and parody. Although the economic theory
of judicial decisions may be implicit, the decisions should reflect the
outcomes predicted by the model.°' The positive theory fails if it
does not explain the results of judicial decision-making. 62
The cases concerning unpublished writings raise a significant
challenge to the economic explanation of fair use offered by Landes
and Posner. First, most of the cases do not conform to the expected
results suggested by Landes and Posner. Second, the two cases
reaching the expected result are decided on grounds that do not
conform with the expected rationales. In short, the economic model
fails its most important tests.
A. Testing an Economic Model
The law and economics movement purports to be a scientific
method for studying decision making, and as such it sets a high
standard for itself in terms of verification. Under a scientific theory,
as described by its advocates, the hypothesis that fair use promotes
economic efficiency must survive the criticism that the economic
theory fails to describe what judges do." If the theory fails to predict
judicial behavior, the hypothesis is disproved.
As an approach to legal interpretation, law and economics is
an unstable combination of two positivist intellectual approaches.
In positive economic analysis, the test of a descriptive or positive
theory is its ability to survive tests designed to prove it wrong. 64 A
eI See R. POSNER, supra note 35, at 21. Posner states:
Although few judicial opinions contain explicit references to economic concepts,
often the true grounds of legal decision are concealed rather than illuminated
by the characteristic rhetoric of opinions .... It would not be suprising to find
that legal doctrines rest on inarticulate gropings toward efficiency, especially
when we bear in mind that many of those doctrines date back to the late
eighteenth and nineteenth century, when a laissez faire ideology based on classical
economics was the dominant ideology of the educated classes in society.
Id.
" For an analysis of the failure of law and economics to explain the law of fraud and
privacy, see K. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 161-78,248-65 (1988).
63 See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
64
 Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law and Economics, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 815,817 (1990).
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strong hypothesis survives repeated challenges to its predictive pow-
ers.65 Legal positivism, likewise, attempts to describe the rules of a
society as they exist. Modern legal positivists, however, do not claim
to predict judicial behavior. 66 In an attempt to determine the un-
derlying rules guiding decision makers, such as judges, the legal
positivist may provide a historical explanation for the behavior but
does not purport to predict the decision in the next hard case. 67 In
this sense, these theories of economics and law make for strange
positivist bedfellows: one attempts to be predictive while the other
focuses upon historical interpretation.
Rather than resolve the unlikely marriage of the modern views
of positive law and positive economics, the school of law and eco-
nomics falls into a middle area. "The stated methodology of Chicago
School law & economics is at once legal positivism and economic
positivism."68 The School takes from legal positivism the goal of
defining the legal rules the decision makers are using. From eco-
nomic positivism, it borrows the methodology of testing hy-
potheses. 69 The goal is to be "scientific" within a paradigm defined
by a faith that legal behavior can be explained in economic terms."
Unlike other modern positivists, however, the advocates of law and
economics claim success in terms of predictive outcomes. As Judge
Posner explains, "[t]he object of scientific research—and the aspi-
ration of economic analysis of law is to be scientific, whatever the
achievements to date—is to increase our ability to predict and con-
trol our environment, in this case our social environment." 71
B. Predictions
The ability of a model to predict judicial behavior becomes,
then, a measure of the success of the economic model. For the
economic theory to serve as a predictor, it should describe how cases
are decided based on the application of some basic economic as-
sumptions. As applied to copyright, the economic theory suggests
that protection depends on the need to provide incentives to write
" Id.
" Id.
47 Id. at 819.
" Id. at 817.
09 Id.
7° Id. at 822.
71 Posner, The Future of Law and Economics: A Comment on Ellickson, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
57, 61 (1989).
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original works. 72 If judges decide fair use questions using this in-
centives rationale, three factors should be particularly evident in
the cases and serve as a means for testing the viability of the Posner
and Landes claims.
First, fair use should support productive uses of unpublished
materials. The use of the unpublished writings in biography or
criticism, especially letters and diaries, is a productive one. That is,
the second use is an extension that would not supplant the original
document. 73 Reading a biography or particular literary criticism
would not diminish the market for collections of the original writ-
ings. In fact, it may enhance it. 74 Similarly, evidence that the second
work has had little effect on the market for the unpublished works
would support a finding of fair use, and is consistent with a pro-
ductive use.
Second, a court should find a fair use when the motive for
writing the original work is not remunerative. The letters by Rich-
ard Wright to Margaret Walker, for example, conveyed his advice
to her on dealing with editors, his trials with editors and other daily
matters. 75 The need for an economic incentive to write these mis-
sives is not apparent. 76
Third, a court should find a fair use when the amount of
original writing used is small compared to the amount that is avail-
able. In the case of literary figures, unpublished letters, while sub-
stantively important, supplement a large body of published works
and other sources, such as interviews, available to describe the cop-
ier's subject." Thus, the use of the unpublished materials generally
would not displace the subject's prior work.
The application of the fair use privilege, if it is consistent with
the application of the Landes and Posner model, therefore, would
favor limited productive use of unpublished materials when the
amount used is small and the original purpose for writing the work
is not remunerative. In contrast, if the copy amounted to a collection
of the unpublished works, the original works would receive more
72 See supra text accompanying notes 34-60.
" See Fisher, supra note 11, at 1743; Leval, supra note 7, at 1111-16.
" See Landes and Posner, supra note II, at 359.
" Wright v. Walker, 748 F. Supp. 105, Ill (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
76 See Leval, supra note 7, at 1119 ("To conclude that documents created for purposes
outside the concerns of copyright should receive more vigorous protection than the writings
that copyright was conceived to protect is bizarre and contradictory").
77 See W. ZINSSER, supra note 6, at 14-16 (describing the use of interviews and travel as
a means of developing an understanding of the subject of biography).
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protection because the use is not as productive and would likely
displace the publication by the authors or their heirs. If the unpub-
lished work itself was prepared for publication, it would receive less
protection than other forms of original writings. Thus, the appli-
cation of the economic model of fair use, though not always pro-
tecting the copier, would favor biographers and critics.
C. The Unpublished Writings Cases
Yet in a strange twist, the Supreme Court and the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals have given authors (or more often their
heirs) a nearly absolute veto on the use of unpublished writings.
Three cases, Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 78 New Era Publications
Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 79 and Love v. Kwitny, 8° are notably incon-
sistent with the economic model of fair use.
In Salinger, author J.D. Salinger successfully prevented the use,
in a literary biography by Ian Hamilton, of unpublished letters to
neighbors, friends, teachers and publishers.'" Hamilton located the
letters, without the assistance of Salinger, at various university li-
braries where their recipients had deposited them." When Hamil-
ton completed his biography, he sent a copy to Solingen" In re-
spOnse, Salinger registered seventy-nine letters for copyright
protection and instructed his lawyer to attempt to bar publication
of the book until Hamilton deleted the unpublished letters. 84 In
response to Salinger's objection, Hamilton closely paraphrased most
of the letters, but two hundred words of direct quotation re-
mained." At trial, Salinger disavowed any intent to publish the
letters during his lifetime, though the value of the letters was esti-
mated at $500,000. 86 The district court, however, found that the
value of the letters would not be impaired by the publication of the
biography. 87 Apart from any financial considerations, Salinger
m 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). See infra notes 81-94 and accompanying text.
79 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1988). See
infra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
" 706 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
81
 Salinger, 811 F.2d at 92-93.




" Id. at 99.
" Id.
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wanted to maintain his privacy; as he explained to Hamilton, "he
preferred not to have his biography written during his lifetime." 88
Though these facts appear to offer a paradigmatic situation for
the economic theory of fair use,89 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals thought otherwise. In reversing the district court's finding
of fair use, the court of appeals neglected or revised several of the
economic factors. Though it found that the first factor, the scholarly
use favored Hamilton, it also noted that the biographer's right was
limited to "copying facts." 9° Copying for accuracy or vividness po-
tentially overstepped the allowance made for a scholarly use. Con-
cerning the nature of the work, the court concluded that unpub-
lished works "normally enjoy complete protection against copying
any protected expression." 9 ' As to the substantiality of copying, the
court counted as copies both the direct quotation and the close
paraphrases, thus expanding the amount of material copied. 92 Fi-
nally, the court of appeals revised the lower court's determination
that the biography would not impair the market for the original
writings, noting that Salinger could change his mind concerning
publication." It also suggested that any impairment of the market
for the letters weighed against the copying." In sum, the decision
did not support the economic model in any significant way.
In New Era Publications Intl v. Henry Holt Co., the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed a decision denying an injunction but
castigated the lower court's application of an economic model of
fair use. In this case, the publishing company holding the rights to
L. Ron Hubbard's writings sued to prevent the publication of a
critical biography. Several letters and unpublished diaries were
among the materials used by the biographer to demonstrate that
ffi5 Id. at 92.
" First, the use was productive. Hamilton was attempting to write a critical biography
of Salinger, not a reiteration of Salinger's prior work. Second, Salinger did not prepare the
original work, mostly letters, for remuneration. Third, the amounts that Hamilton used in
the final work were very small, especially after he went to the trouble of removing or
paraphrasing most of Salinger's original writings.
'° Id. at 96.
91
 Id. at 97.
" Id.
93 Id. at 99.
94 Id. "We do not share the District Judge's view that marketability of the letters will be
totally unimpaired. To be sure, the book would not displace the market for the letters. . . •
Yet some impairment of the market seems likely." Id. In a rather odd twist, the court then
notes that the bad paraphrasing in the biography may detract from the value of the original
work. If that is so, then the court's use of the close paraphrasing to establish substantiality
appears contrived.
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Hubbard's public statements about his background and beliefs were
far different from his history and private ruminations. 95 The district
court decision extensively reviewed each of the quotations from the
unpublished materials and determined that most , were used for a
productive use of criticism. 96 Less clear are the motives of L. Ron
Hubbard in producing the diaries and letters. Hubbard appeared
to have a substantial interest in making money throughout his life,
but many of the letters were unrelated to his published works. Like
Salinger, Hubbard was a writer, and these letters did not enter into
the body of his published work. The amount used by the infringer
compared to the total of Hubbard's writings was small. 97 Finally,
the district court analyzed the likely markets to be affected by
publication of a critical biography and found no impact." On bal-
ance, these facts again favored a finding of fair use according to
the law and economics approach.
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in its review
of the district court decision, concluded that unpublished works
were entitled to extraordinary protection and refused to accept the
fine distinctions the district court offered. For example, the appel-
late court held that the first factor in the fair use analysis, the
purpose of the use, did not require an analysis of the individual
quotations to determine whether each was used for an appropriate
purpose. 99 As to the second factor, the nature of the work, the court
rejected any suggestion that the copier could expect a favorable
resolution based on the use made of the copied material.m Finally,
the appellate court rejected the lower court's careful distinctions
concerning the market effect of publication.'°' Thus, the determi-
nation that some of the copied work was unpublished led the court
to the conclusion that an infringement occurred. Only the copyright
holder's delay in attempting to secure relief prevented the grant of
an injunction. 1 °2
Likewise, the decision in Love v. Kwitny'" does not demonstrate
any strong economic rationale along the lines predicted by the
95 New Era, 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1498 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d
Cir. 1988).
95 Id. at 1507-20.
97 Id. at 1520-22.
" Id. at 1523.
' New Era, 873 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1988).
io° Id,
1111 Id.
1" Id. at 584-85.
'°' 706 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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model. The copied work was a student project describing the au-
thor's observations as a reporter for the New York Times during the
Shah's takeover of Iran in 1953. The author sent a copy of the work
to Allen Dulles, and the copy became part of the collected papers
of Dulles at Princeton University. Another writer used the paper as
part of a chapter in his book criticizing the American media for its
failure to expose Central Intelligence Agency activities.'"
The book exhibited the basic elements of the economic model
of fair use. First, the use of the work was productive. The infringer
did not use the material to describe what occurred in Iran in 1953.
Rather, he used the material to demonstrate the failure of the media
to report information about CIA activities to which they had access.
Second, the paper was not written for remuneration. The author
did not attempt to publish it and made only vague claims about an
intention to do so. Though the copier quoted a large portion of the
original work, his critical use of the material further suggested a
strong justification for allowing such use.
Following the decisions of the Second Circuit, the district court
held that the use was an infringement. Though the use was schol-
arly, the court concluded that the copier could use the facts but not
the manner in which the facts were conveyed.'°5 Second, the court
found that the unpublished nature of the work weighed heavily
against fair use, even though its inclusion might be for the purpose
of improving the accuracy of the new work and the paper was
distributed to a significant audience.m° The court rejected as well
the suggestion that the works served different purposes, even
though the court accepted the scholarly and critical use of the
paper.'" The amount used weighed heavily against the copier, es-
pecially because the copier appeared less than honest in his attempt
to secure permission to quote from the work.'" As to the market
impact, the court again accepted the assertion that the author could
change his mind and decide to publish the work.'"
Unlike the prior examples, the outcome in Harper and Row,
Publishers v. Nation Enterprises is consistent with the economic
model."° In this case, the publisher sued to recover from the Nation
1°4 Love, 706 F. Supp. at 1125-28.
100 Id, at 1132-33.




1 D9 Id. at 1135.
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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magazine the loss of income caused by Time magazine's termination
of a serialization contract. Before Time's release of the serialization
of the Gerald Ford memoirs, a Nation magazine editor received a
stolen copy of the memoirs and used them to write an article de-
scribing some of Ford's impressions about Richard Nixon and
events during Ford's administration. As a result of the scoop, Time
canceled the serialization and refused to make a final payment on
the contract. Based on the Court's holding that fair use was not a
defense to the Nation's actions, the publisher recovered the lost
payment from the Nation."
Unlike most unpublished materials cases, the law and econom-
ics fair use model supports the result in Nation Enterprises. First, the
use was not productive. The Nation magazine article simply sum-
marized the materials that Time intended to use. As the Court
explained, the Nation's editor "attempted no independent commen-
tary, research or criticism. "112 Second, the author and publisher
clearly prepared the original work for publication." 3 Third, the
infringer's action posed a very real economic danger to the author's
serialization rights. 14
Even though the Nation Enterprises result conforms to the
model, the Court relied on a number of other policies in its decision.
The Court raised questions of privacy, creative control and bad
faith on the part of the Nation's editor."' Thus, the Court seemed
compelled to buttress its argument with factors outside the eco-
nomic paradigm.
Similarly, the decision in Wright v. Warner Books, Inc. "6 conforms
to the economic model in finding that fair use is a defense to
copying. In this case, Margaret Walker, an English professor, wrote
a literary biography of Richard Wright. The book included quota-
tions from several previously unpublished letters from Wright to
Walker.'" Walker used the letters to establish facts about her per-
sonal association with Wright." 8 Furthermore, there was no signif-
icant demonstration that the use would impact the market for
Wright's works. The use of quotation and paraphrasing was very
" t Id. at 542-43.
" 2 Id. at 543.
113 Id. at 542.
'I' Id. at 543.
113 Id. at 554-55,560-69.
116 748 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
117 Id, at 111.
118 Id
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small, the copier did not use the creative portions of the materials
and there was no evidence of harm to any potential market for the
letters. 119
Based on these facts, the court's allowance of the fair use de-
fense appears consistent with the economic model. The use of the
materials was productive. The copier took the original work and
used it to detail her literary biography, not to replicate Wright's
creative genius. The author did not write the original works with
any apparent economic goal. The amounts used were minor. The
market impact, if any, was small. The court, however, added that
the copyright holder's "bad faith" enforcement against some, but
not all, biographers also contributed to a finding of infringement. 12°
It also discussed in detail the privacy concerns raised by the case.
While the result is consistent with the model's predictions, the lan-
guage of the decision fails to support the economic model.
In summary, the economic model predicts that the level of
protection for unpublished works such as letters and diaries would
be relatively low if the use is productive, the incentives to write the
original work are not injured, and the amount of the original work
used is small. The cases, however, do not support the conclusion
that the courts have adopted an economic model to deal with un-
published works. In three of the five examples, the decision is either
plainly inconsistent with the model or of doubtful applicability. In
the two cases in which the model and the result are consistent, the
courts' rationales raise significant doubts about the model's impor-
tance to the particular outcome.
IV. NORMATIVE AND POSITIVE CRITICISMS OF THE ECONOMIC
MODEL
A. The Limits of Normative Criticisms
Normative criticisms of the economic model of copyright offer
useful but incomplete explanations for the difference between pre-
diction and result. These criticisms fall into three categories. First,
the informational requirements of the model are overwhelming.
Second, the legal economist's base assumption of maximizing value
in setting rules does not result in predictable rules. Third, the model
fails to account for the more complicated ethical structure of copy-
119 Id. at 112-13.
140 Id. at 113.
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right and fair use. Each criticism is telling in a different way, but
only the third suggests a rationale that is inconsistent with the
economic model as a positive description of copyright and fair use
law. The third normative criticism also offers an explanation that is
consistent with the way judges say they are deciding cases, and thus
offers some promise for future model construction.
Judges are not likely to use an economic model if the infor-
mation required to decide cases according to that model is not
available. In the case of fair use, the information required is very
great and unlikely to be available. As Professor Fisher explains, the
judge in each case would have to identify all possible uses of the
work, determine the gains and losses to society for each use, rank
those uses and then divide infringing and fair uses by the relative
loss or gain of each."' Fisher concludes, "[flew judges would be
willing, when confronted with a copyright infringement case in
which the defendant invoked the fair use defense, to attempt an
analysis of the sort sketched [in his discussion]. Of those inclined to
commence such a project, few would succeed."'" The reasons are
obvious: courts cannot marshal' the necessary information the
model requires.'"
This first challenge to the economic model, however, does not
address the possibility that judges may be making second-best at-
tempts at economically rational decision making. Fisher himself
suggests the possibility when he derives some general rules from
his description of the economic model. 124 Courts may be making
the same kinds of generalizations. The inconsistent results might
be explained as problems to be expected when applying the model
under less than ideal circumstances. Some judges have a better
economic sense than others or different value preferences. Given
enough decisions, the right economic decision should prevail. As a
' 2 ' Fisher, supra note 11, at 1705-17.
122 Id. at 1739.
I " Id. Fisher continues:
To ascertain the economically optimal package of entitlements for a given type
of copyrighted work using this mode of analysis, the judge would need an
extraordinary amount of information, much of it very hard to obtain. Even
determining popular tastes for different sorts of intellectual products and their
uses would be difficult. Gathering reliable data with regard to such crucial
variables as the sensitivity of different types of artists to fluctuations in their
anticipated incomes and the mutability of each of the relevant sets of preferences
would probably be impossible.
Id,
144 See id. at 1740-44. -
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normative criticism, one can complain that judges should not at-
tempt the impossible. As a positive challenge, however, the criticism
does not preclude the possibility that judges make second-best at-
tempts.
The second criticism of an economic approach to copyright
demonstrates that it is virtually impossible to adopt rules under
either form of optimality used to measure economic efficiency. The
first form of optimality, maximization of social welfare, rests on the
assumption of one optimal point at which everyone is made no
worse off. Following the rules for establishing a Pareto optimal
universe, however, results in a system in which a decision cannot be
made because there are many optimal distributions. One, therefore,
must look for a factor other than maximizing social welfare to
determine which set of rules to use. 125 Going outside the system,
however, violates the assumption that one can decide cases wholly
within an economic model.
The second form of optimality used to measure economic ef-
ficiency solves the indeterminacy problem by substituting wealth for
social welfare. Thus, the system one would choose is that which
maximizes society's wealth.t 26 Two alternative problems are readily
apparent. In the first alternative, this approach suffers from an-
other form of indeterminacy. Manipulating the prices of goods by
changing the rules would increase the output of the higher-valued
items and decrease the output of the lower-valued ones. As the
output changes, however, the prices would reflect the relative abun-
dance of the items. As prices changed, new rules would have to be
adopted to reflect the new maximizing rule. On and on the process
would go, the rules always changing though the goal of wealth
maximization remained the same.' 27
In the second alternative, the economic model may result in a
stagnation of current values due to the endowment effects of copy-
right. The endowment effect is the economic reality that the owner
of a right tends to set a higher selling price for a right than a
nonowner. If the value of the right is set by the person who values
it the most so as to maximize value, those who currently own rights
are favored over those who do not.' 28 Thus, the first set of rights
would control over any later alternative, and the endowment effects
would further distort a reappraisal of the alternative.
I See Yen, supra note 7, at 540.
' 28 See Landes and Posner, supra note 11, at 326.
1" See Yen, supra note 7, at 544-55.
128 Id, at 545.
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Like the criticism concerning lack of information, the argument
concerning indeterminacy of an economic model is essentially nor-
mative. It gives several reasons why judges would not want to adopt
that particular approach, but it does not suggest that they do not
adopt it. Indeed, though it is unlikely, indeterminacy may explain
the chaotic results of the cases concerning unpublished writings.
Economic values change and with them the results of the cases.
The changing results in the cases, however, probably cannot be
explained by either the indetermthacy or endowment effects. One
would expect some period of time to pass before the indeterminacy
appears. These cases and their inconsistent results occurred in a
short period. Likewise, the endowment effects would suggest a
single result in the cases because the intentions of the holders should
all be the same. The inconsistency again suggests that the economic
model does not explain the outcomes.
Finally, Professor Yen points out that wealth maximization ig-
nores a great deal of the ethical nature of values within a society.
Society values many things besides wealth. "[I]f wealth maximiza-
tion truly identifies the optimal social order, it must do so because
a society which maximizes wealth necessarily observes all other val-
ues worth recognizing."'" The Salinger case in particular, with its
striking protection of privacy, bears out this concern. Once again,
however, this argument suggests what courts should consider, not
whether unseen economic forces are driving what they are doing.
On the other hand, this normative criticism may provide a key to
the positive puzzle.
B. Using the Normative Criticisms to Explain Fair Use
A positive model of fair use should attempt to predict out-
comes. It may coincidentally also reflect the beliefs of the decision
makers, but it need not. If, however, it fails to predict behavior and
does not reflect the values of the decision makers, these failures
suggest the need for a new model.
In the positivist view of the world, it would not matter if the
economic theory and the courts' rationales did not coincide with
one another. "One could claim that if the theory works to predict
behavior, attitudes, or even legal decisions, then the correspondence
' 29 Id. at 542. Professor llovenkamp makes a similar point when he notes that the law
and economics school fails to account for the significantly more complicated value structure
that motivates legislators. Hovenkamp, supra note 64, at 835-47.
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between the conceptual framework of the analyst and that of the
subject is irrelevant."'" In copyright cases concerning unpublished
writings, however, the economic model fails to describe the results
about half of the time. In the other half, the courts' rationales
generally reach beyond economic theory. As a result, the model as
applied in this area is somewhat suspect as a positive explanation
of the courts' decision making.
Because the model does not describe the results of these cases,
one might then look at what the courts are saying. A better theory
might attempt to integrate both what courts do and what they say
they are doing.'" In that same regard, the positive claims made by
Landes and Posner for their copyright model pose some significant
problems because the actors, judges, do not see the world through
the same economically tinted lens.
As suggested by those who think decision making is more com-
plicated than the economic model permits, the cases demonstrate
that the courts consider several factors other than wealth maximi-
zation in making decisions concerning fair use. In this regard, one
commentator suggests that the courts are imposing an unusual and
value-laden hierarchy concerning the kinds of writings being ad-
dressed, their users and their users' motives.' 32 The cases seem to
support the notion that the courts do make some sort of decision
about the ethical conduct of the parties. In the Nation Enterprises
decision, for example, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized
the bad faith of the Nation's editor in using materials he should
have known were stolen.' 33 In Wright, the court went through the
economic analysis but then bolstered its opinion by noting the bad
faith of Wright's widow in selectively prosecuting the defendant.' 34
In Salinger, the court repeatedly emphasized the privacy concerns
of J.D. Salinger.'" While none of these factors are necessarily in-
consistent with the view that the courts decide cases to maximize
wealth, they support an alternative theory when they appear central
to court decisions that do not follow the model.
ISO
	 SCHEPPELE, supra note 62, at 162.
131 Id. ("If a theory both explains the phenomena and corresponds to the way in which
the subjects of the theory view the world, then it might be claimed that, as between two
theories that explain equally well, the one that also corresponds to the view of the subjects
is better, on the view that theories that explain more are better than theories that explain
less").
"2 See Conley, supra note 9, at 20-23.
1 °" See supra text accompanying note 115.
"4 See supra text accompanying notes 116-20.
133 See supra text accompanying notes 81-94.
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The model also ignores the openly conflicting views of the
inspiration for copyright law and fair use.'" While some claim that
fair use is a utilitarian device, others have found in copyright ele-
ments of natural law,'" Hegelian allocation to facilitate use and the
limited power of positive law to describe rights.' 38 It is little wonder,
then, that one finds in the decisions attempts to protect social utility,
reward the author for his labors, protect the author's privacy and
creative rights, and accord the law with custom,'" The contrasting
view that copyright promotes a single world view of wealth max-
imization is an interesting normative argument, but it does not
comport with reality. Thus, the Landes and Posner theory of copy-
right fails as a positive explanation of copyright and fair use, at
least in an increasingly important area of litigation, the treatment
of unpublished factual writings.
CONCLUSION
While Landes and Posner apparently overstate their claim that
fair use cases can be explained by their essentially utilitarian theory
of copyright, their theory does offer an analytical tool for criticizing
difficult cases concerning unpublished materials. Underlying the
law and economics approach is a notion that fair use permits ad-
vances in knowledge. In contrast, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals' treatment of unpublished writings appears to frustrate that
interest. Ian Hamilton's response to the court's decision in Salinger
presents interesting anecdotal support. Instead of writing a critical
biography of Salinger, Hamilton produced a largely autobiograph-
ical work describing his efforts to write about Salinger.'" Thus, the
Salinger example shows how excessive copyright protection may
frustrate legitimate literary efforts. In effect, the advancement of
learning is suppressed and the utilitarian goal frustrated. As a nor-
mative tool, then, the Landes and Posner model may provide aca-
demics and practitioners with another argument for attacking the
broad protection afforded unpublished writings.
156 See Nance, Forward; Owning Ideas, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 757 (1990).
I " Yen, supra note 7, at 522-39.
138 Fisher, supra note 11, at 1691-92,
"9 See id. at 1686-91; Dratler, supra note I I, at 333-34.
lo Perry, supra note 9, at A22, coi. 4.
